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Abstract
Over the past several months, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated both industrialized
and developing countries all over the world. By early late November 2020, the World Health
Organization (WHO) reported a total of 56,261,952 confirmed cases and 1,349,506 deaths in 214
countries.1 The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most serious public health crisis the United
States has faced in decades.2 With millions of lives hanging in the balance due to lack of effective
vaccines and medical treatments, governments and pharmaceutical companies across the globe are
taking unprecedented measures to spur the development of vaccines and treatments for combating
COVID-19. According to ClinicalTrials.gov, there are 3507 studies currently registered to
investigate COVID-19.3 However, monopolies created by intellectual property (IP) protection and
regulatory exclusivities can pose barriers to competition and impede market entry and scale-up of
more affordable generic and biosimilar products critical for saving millions of lives. Given the
magnitude of devastation caused by COVID-19 worldwide, this paper argues that there is a
pressing need to adapt the present IP policy by reducing the barriers to ensure equitable and
affordable access to essential COVID-19 vaccines and treatments for people in need.
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I.

Introduction
The right to health is a fundamental and universal human right.4;5 One key component of

the right to health is access to medicines and health technologies.6 As stated in the Human Rights
Council’s Resolution adopted in June 2011, “access to medicine is one of the fundamental
elements in achieving progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 7
The monopoly rights granted under patent laws and regulatory exclusivities have adverse
impacts on access to essential medicines, especially for underprivileged patients in low-income
countries. Prior to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement,
pharmaceuticals were not patentable in national laws of about fifty countries.8 In 1995, intellectual
property protection started to be coupled with the trade because a prerequisite to become a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is signing the TRIPS Agreement. Under TRIPS, patent
protection to inventions in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals, is mandatory for a
20-year period.9
The outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1990s, which resulted in an estimated 65
million infections and 32.7 million deaths10, highlighted the problems of access to life-saving
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medicines in developing and low-income countries and drew global attention to the conflicts
between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the fundamental right to health.11;12
The present COVID-19 pandemic, which has taken 1.35 million lives as of late November
2020, has once again highlighted the need to address the tension between the right to health and
IPRs.13 Due to its “winner-take-all” principle, patent law presents significant barriers to the rapid
development of much-needed health technologies by disincentivizing the sharing of pre-patenting
or unpatentable knowledge that could be valuable for drug discovery and development.
In addition, exclusive rights lead to competitive pricing and restrict large-scale
manufacturing across the globe, thus negatively impacting equitable and affordable access to
innovative health technologies. For example, in the past decades, high prices for patented
treatments have undermined countries’ capacity to supply treatments for tuberculosis (TB),
HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, and cancer to patients in need. Also, it has been argued that unmerited
patents on key technologies that block follow-on producers had delayed the availability of more
affordable vaccines and treatments in low- and middle-income countries (LIMCs).14 Moreover,
due to the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with
reduced health budgets, the ability of governments to subsidize COVID-19 medicines and vaccines
and the ability of patients to pay out-of-pocket has been significantly eroded.15 Thus, reducing
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market monopolies and ensuring earlier competition will help to increase affordable and fair access
to COVID-19 medicines and vaccines.
However, the problems of access to life-saving medicines cannot be fully addressed by
solely relying on voluntary commitments by phartmaceutical companies. In response to a petition
by South Africa and India to the WTO calling for waiver or suspension on the granting or
enforcement of any patents and other IP related to COVID-19 drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics for
the duration of the pandemic, 16 on October 8, 2020, US-based pharmaceutical corporation
Moderna, developer of one of the four front-running COVID-19 vaccine candidates, announced
its decision to not enforce its patents on COVID-19 vaccine technologies throughout the duration
of the pandemic and issue open licenses for the post-pandemic period. However, currently,
Moderna is the only company that pledged to openly share its patents for the COVID-19 drugs and
vaccines. In addition, Member States of the WTO have failed to reach an agreement that would
have temporarily waived intellectual property rights for vaccines and treatments related to
COVID-19 as the pandemic continues worldwide.17
To achieve a better balance between private IPRs and public health, and to increase access
to essential medicines to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper proposes an integrated
approach that utilizes various policy instruments, including the flexibilities within the TRIPS
Agreement. Part II provides a brief introduction to the IP system and the global IP framework as
defined by the international treaties, e.g., TRIPS, and discusses how some of the IP practices and
regulatory exclusivities become barriers to access to essential health technologies for fighting the
COVID-19 pandemic. Part III discusses several policy instruments that can be taken at national,
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regional, and international levels, including: (i) restricting the grant of patent evergreening by
applying stricter patentability criteria; (ii) restricting patenting of repurposed or combination drugs;
(iii) reducing or suspending regulatory exclusivities (i.e., data exclusivity, market exclusivity) to
facilitate rapid regulatory approval of COVID-19-related generic and biosimilar products; (iv)
reducing or suspending patent linkage; (v) suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs;
(vi) issuing compulsory licenses; (vii) invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS
Agreement; and (viii) participating in medicine patent pool and the Open COVID Pledge.
It should be noted that each of the above policy instruments has its advantages and
disadvantages. Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and countries should tailor these policy
instruments in accordance with their particular circumstances and needs.
II.

The IP Systems and Barriers to Access to Health Technologies
The IPRs granted through the IP systems and the global IP framework, as defined by the

WIPO treaties, the TRIPS Agreement, free trade agreements (FTAs), regulatory exclusivities, and
patent linkage, are the primary schemes that give rise to monopolies of health technologies.
Although such monopolies are believed to be important for driving innovations18, in many cases,
they also constitute barriers to competition and delay market entry of more affordable generic
drugs. A good understanding of the current IP systems and the underlying factors of the barriers is
a prerequisite for formulating solutions to reduce or eliminate the barriers to ensure broad access
to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments.
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3.1.

IP systems
IP refers to a category of property, including intangible creations of the human mind,19

such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. The fundamental goal of the patent
system is to offer a mechanism to encourage the dissemination of technical knowledge.20 The
patent system achieves this goal through a quid pro quo—in exchange for the exclusive right, the
applicant is obligated to fully disclose the technical details of the invention to enable society to
make and/or use the invention.21
By providing rights to exclude third-party use of protected inventions, IP protection
strengthens market-based incentives to invest resources for development and marketing of new
technologies. 22 Such incentives are critical for research and development of new medical
technologies due to the requirement of substantial investment of financial and technical resources,
the high risk of failure associated with product development, and issues related to product liability.
Generally, it is very costly to develop new medical technologies but relatively cheaper to reproduce
or reverse engineer. Thus, it would be unsustainable for companies to invest resources and assume
a significant risk of failure in product development and regulatory approval if their competitors
are allowed to take a free ride.
On the other hand, IP protection can be a barrier to competition by preventing entry of
generic products. In addition, it can also impede further innovation by hindering access to new
technologies. Further, the use of the exclusive right can contribute to market distortion and lead to
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high prices of goods and market inefficiencies. 23 Thus, IP policy needs to accommodate and
balance various legitimate interests, including public and private interests, in a delicate way to
promote public health.24
3.2.

International IP framework established by international treaties and free trade

agreements
3.2.1. TRIPS Agreement
The global IP framework is mainly defined by the treaties (e.g., the Paris Convention)
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the TRIPS Agreement.
Most countries in the world, including all the Member States of the WTO, are parties to the TRIPS
Agreement. TRIPS, with the objectives of “the promotion of technological innovation and “the
transfer and dissemination of technology,” mandates implementation of international standards
that require IP protection to be available for inventions in all areas of technology (e.g., medical
technologies) and protection against unfair commercial use for undisclosed test data submitted for
obtaining marketing approval.25;26 Note that the global, multilateral IP framework, established by
the WIPO treaties and the TRIPS Agreement, only sets minimum standards for the Member States.
The Member States are free to implement more extensive protections based on their own national
priorities and needs.
In 2001, the Doha Declaration—a landmark declaration adopted by the WTO—reaffirmed
the objectives and principles of TRIPS as guidance for implementing the TRIPS provisions in line
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with public health policy. The Doha Declaration provides a set of flexibilities within the TRIPS
legal framework. One of such flexibilities is compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing is when
a government allows someone else to produce a patented product or process without the consent
of the patent owner or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself.27 Specific situations in
which compulsory licenses may be issued are set out in the legislation of each patent system and
vary between systems. The situations in which a compulsory license may be granted include lack
of working over an extended period in the territory of the patent, inventions funded by the
government, failure or inability of a patentee to meet a demand for a patented product and where
the refusal to grant a license leads to the inability to exploit an important technological advance,
or to exploit a further patent.28 TRIPs also provides that the requirements for a compulsory license
may be waived in certain situations, in particular cases of national emergency or extreme urgency
or in cases of public non-commercial use. 29 Article 31.f of TRIPS requires that compulsory
licenses be used “predominantly” for local markets, a requirement that complicates the ability of
countries to import drugs manufactured overseas.30
3.2.2. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Certain IP provisions in FTAs are of particular relevance to the health technologies
sector.31 Those IP provisions in FTAs affecting the pharmaceutical sector include definitions of
patentability criteria; patent term extensions (PTE) and other similar instruments; regulatory
exclusivities; patent linkage with regulatory approval; and IPRs enforcement such as border
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measures. In the past decade, many FTAs have also reaffirmed the Doha Declaration, including
the right to take measures to protect public health.32
When the TRIPS Agreement went into effect in 1995, there were 44 FTAs in force. By
December 2019, the number of FTAs had surpassed 300, most of which contain IP provisions.33
About twenty percent of the FTAs contain provisions requiring the parties to implement higher
standards for protection and enforcement of IPRs than those in the TRIPS Agreement.34 Such
provisions are generally referred to as “TRIPS-plus.” For example, some FTAs specify how to
apply patentability criteria and disclosure requirements.35 Some FTAs contain provisions allowing
the patent term to extend beyond 20 years to compensate for the time patent owners spend in
obtaining marketing approval.36 While the TRIPS Agreement does not provide an exhaustive list
of grounds for granting compulsory licenses, some FTAs, such as the United States-Australia FTA,
limit grounds to situations of extreme urgency and public non-commercial use.37
3.3.

Barriers created by patent evergreening and second medical use patents
A patent will be granted to an inventor if the invention is novel, non-obvious, and useful

to a person skilled in the art. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “patents should be
available for any inventions, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable
of industrial application.” 38 Under the TRIPS Agreement, countries have flexibilities in
determining how to apply the patentability criteria.

32
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Companies often employ patenting strategies to seek new monopolies or prolong market
exclusivity through, for example, applying for secondary patents on known medicines. Such
patenting practice is known as “patent evergreening.” Evergreening, as defined by the 2003 WHO
Commission on IP, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), is a term popularly used to describe
patent holders’ use of various strategies to extend the period of exclusivity beyond the 20-year
patent term, even absent apparent additional benefits.39 The commercial benefits of evergreening
patents are significant. A study by Kapczynski et al. of the 1,304 patents on new molecular entities
listed in the FDA’s Orange Book shows that secondary patent claims extended patent protection
by an average of 6 to 7 years.40
When a known substance previously used for a certain non-medical purpose is found
effective in the treatment of disease, a patent application may be filed to claim the “first medical
indication,” also called “new use” or “second use” of the known substance. 41 If the known
substance previously used for a certain medical purpose is found effective for another medical use,
such medical use is called “second medical indication.”42 Article 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement
permits countries to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals from patenting. 43 However, the TRIPS agreement does not address the
patentability of the first and second medical indications, and national patent laws differ on this
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WHO, Public health, innovation and intellectual property rights, Report of the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), ISBN 9241563230, Geneva, Switzerland 2006, p.131,
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40
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41
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42
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point.44 Some jurisdictions (e.g., Argentina, Philippines) specifically rule out patenting the first or
second medical indication inventions. Some other jurisdictions allow both the first and second
medical indication inventions. For example, Article 54(4) and (5) of the European Patent
Convention (EPC), as revised in 2000 (referred to as EPC 2000), state that the novelty requirement
does not exclude the patentability of a known substance used for a new method for treatment or
diagnosis.45
The patentability of first and second medical indications is still a subject of debate,
exemplifying the continuing challenge in patent law of balancing access against innovation.
Opponents of medical indication patents express concerns that such patents can restrict access to
medicines and reward uninventive activities and unjustly extend patent protection for medicines.
3.4.

Barriers created by regulatory exclusivities
Regulatory exclusivities are conferred by national or regional law, which provide another

mechanism of protection independent of IP protection. The period of protection through regulatory
exclusivity may overlap with or be additional to the term of patent protection.
Regulatory exclusivities include data exclusivity (i.e., protection of test data) and market
exclusivity. Data exclusivity prevents regulatory authorities, such as the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), from relying on the test data previously submitted by an originator (e.g.,
for a brand name drug) as reference data for approval of a generic medicine for a certain period of
time.46 Market exclusivity, on the other hand, prevents regulatory authorities from granting market
approval for a certain period of time. Unlike data exclusivity, market exclusivity prevents a
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competitor from obtaining regulatory approval, even without referring to the test data from the
originator.47
Member States of the WTO generally grant exclusivity rights for a fixed period of between
five and eight years, which can be further extended in some cases. The US provides a wide range
of regulatory exclusivities, including five years’ data exclusivity for new chemical entities
(NCEs). 48 As for new biological entities (NBEs) (e.g., antibody drugs), the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act provides twelve years’ data exclusivity and four years’ market
exclusivity. In other words, a biosimilar product cannot obtain approval for four years after the
date of the approval of its reference product, nor can it be approved until twelve years after the
reference product’s approval date if it relies upon the test data of the reference product. In addition,
to encourage firms to develop drugs to treat rare diseases and conditions (i.e., diseases affecting
fewer than 200,000 people in the US), the US provides seven years’ exclusivity to orphan drugs,
called orphan drug exclusivity. Gilead was caught in the controversy after it applied for and
obtained the orphan drug designation from the US FDA in March 2020. Under the US Orphan
Drugs Act, the orphan drug designation provides a seven-year market exclusivity in addition to
tax and other incentives. Gilead was reprimanded for applying for such designation in seeking
additional exclusivity “despite calls for solidarity” to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.49 After facing
sharp criticism, Gilead announced that it had rescinded the orphan drug designation.50
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In comparison, the European Union (EU) uses a system of exclusivity called the “8+2+1”
system.51 The EU’s system grants originator drugs eight years of data protection and ten years of
marketing protection, both starting at marketing approval of the originator drugs.52 This means
marketing approval for a prospective generic competitor can only be granted at the end of the tenyear marketing protection period, which is extendable to eleven years.
The granting of regulatory exclusivities, including data exclusivities, generally increases
the expectation of revenues of bringing a product to market. Thus, in theory, it incentivizes
development of new products at the expense of delaying the entry of generic products.
3.5.

Barriers created by patent linkage
Normally, IP protection and regulatory exclusivities are two separate mechanisms of

protection granted by different agencies independent of each other. Nevertheless, some countries,
including the US, link regulatory approval (based on safety, efficacy, and quality) of a new
medicine to its patenting status, which is generally referred to as “patent linkage.” In the US, patent
linkage is statutorily recognized by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, otherwise known as the Hatch Waxman Act.53 Under the Act, a manufacturer seeking
marketing approval for a generic drug must submit certification to the FDA that its marketing
approval will not infringe any patents of the originator on the reference drug listed in the FDA
“Orange Book.” 54 A stronger patent linkage prohibits market entry of generic drugs until the
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53
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14

expiry of the patent.55 An even stronger version of patent linkage prohibits consideration of the
marketing approval of a generic drug before the expiry of the patent. Since TRIPS, the US has
negotiated a series of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements having “TRIPS-Plus” IP
provisions requiring trading partners to establish patent linkage mechanisms.56
Not surprisingly, patent linkage has been found to have an adverse effect on access to
medicines, by delaying market entry of generic drugs and enabling high prices of originator drugs
by shielding them from generic competition.57; 58 It has also been argued that patent linkage places
regulatory agencies in the role of enforcers of patents.59 Notably, some patent linkage provisions
make no exception for generic medicines produced under compulsory licenses. Thus, such patent
linkage provisions can unjustifiably extend exclusivity of originator drugs in the market since the
regulatory agencies are unable to consider market approval of generic drugs during the patent
period.
On the other hand, originator companies and proponents of patent linkage argue that patent
linkage is a reasonable means to ensure that the regulatory authorities do not promote infringement
and that it increases transparency and predictability by identifying patents associated with each
pharmaceutical product as part of the market approval process.60; 61 However, such arguments are
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not well-founded because adequate IP protection can be achieved through private enforcement of
IPRs via the judicial system even if patent linkage is not available.62
III. Increasing Access to COVID-19 Related Vaccines and Treatments
Over the past few months, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated industrialized countries
and developing countries all over the world. While several of the therapeutic candidates under
clinical investigation as COVID-19 treatments are now off patent, other drugs being studied are
under patent protection.63 With IPRs and regulatory exclusivities, pharmaceutical companies can
control who can produce medicines and where they can be supplied. Furthermore, the lack of
access to IP, data, and technical know-how impedes market entry and scale-up of more affordable
generic and biosimilar products.
To overcome the barriers of market dominance and access to patented health technologies
and products needed for COVID-19 treatment, diagnosis, and prevention, countries can make use
of a range of public health safeguards, including the built-in flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreements
and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS. To this end, this paper proposes an integrated approach
featuring several policy instruments that can be employed at national, regional, and international
levels, such as: (i) restricting the grant of patent evergreening by applying stricter patentability
criteria; (ii) restricting patenting of repurposed or combo drugs; (iii) reducing or suspending
regulatory exclusivities (i.e., data exclusivity, market exclusivity) to facilitate rapid regulatory
approval of COVID-19-related generic and biosimilar products; (iv) reducing or suspending patent
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linkage; (v) suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs; (vi) issuing compulsory licenses;
(vii) invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement; and (viii) participating in
medicine patent pools and the Open COVID Pledge. It should be emphasized, however, that each
individual instrument has advantages and disadvantages. If needed, countries should undertake
these policy instruments in concert and adapt them according to nations’ priorities and needs.
4.1.

Restricting patent evergreening by applying stricter patentability criteria
Patent evergreening is a patenting strategy pharmaceutical companies often employ to seek

new monopolies or prolong market exclusivity. It is in the public interest of all nations to refrain
from allowing “patent evergreening” through secondary patents derived from a parent patent by
applying stricter patentability criteria. While excluding entire fields of technology (e.g., medicines,
food) is no longer permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, countries can set more stringent
patenting standards to meet the domestic needs of public health and economy. This will help to
limit granting secondary and new use patents—a practice that often leads to patent evergreening.
Under the present IP systems, whether to grant or refuse a secondary patent is judged based
on its merits. It is important to determine if the secondary patent is separately patent-eligible. The
mere fact that an innovation is incremental is not a ground for refusing a secondary patent claim.
In fact, most innovation is incremental by nature. Some health policy-makers argue that therapeutic
efficacy should be included as an additional criterion to restrict evergreening and that secondary
patents should be granted only if the embodied incremental innovation provides sufficient
therapeutic benefits.64 Although the therapeutic value of a product is not a patentability criterion
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in most jurisdictions, superior therapeutic advantages over the prior art may be considered when
evaluating nonobviousness (or inventive step) of the product. 65
In limiting patent evergreening, some countries have revised their legislation to adopt
narrower patentability criteria. Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act 1970 and Section 26.2 of the
Philippines’ Intellectual Property Code are two examples of a narrow definition of patentability
criteria.66 Other countries apply different approaches. For example, many patent offices, such as
Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, the UK, the US, and EPO patent offices, have established
examination guidelines for pharmaceutical inventions.67 The examination guidelines for patent
examiners adopted by Argentina are along similar lines as Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act
1970.68 Thus, the goal of limiting patent evergreening can be achieved at both legislative and
administrative levels.
4.2.

Restricting patenting of repurposed or combination drugs
Second medical use patents are permitted for repurposed medicines and combination

therapies in some jurisdictions, including the US. The patentability of medical indications is
relevant to our fight against the COVID-19 pandemic considering many of the ongoing clinical
trials are based on either repurposing or combining known drugs. Drug repurposing (also known
as drug repositioning or therapeutic switching) is re-tasking an approved drug for the treatment of
a different disease or medical condition than its original purpose of development. 69 Drug
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repurposing has been pursued to develop safe and effective COVID-19 treatments.70; 71 Several
existing antiviral medications, previously developed for treating severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), HIV/AIDS, and malaria, have been
investigated as potential COVID‑19 treatments, some of which are currently being tested in
clinical trials.72; 73; 74 For example, the world’s largest COVID-19 clinical trial was launched by
the United Kingdom (UK) to test repurposed drugs.75 In particular, drugs included in the trial
protocol are all existing medicines repurposed for COVID-19, such as AbbVie’s Kaletra
(lopinavir/ritonavir), commonly used to treat HIV infection; dexamethasone, an anti-inflammatory
steroid; hydroxychloroquine, an antimalarial drug; and the antibiotic azithromycin.76
Currently, there are eleven registered COVID-19 clinical trials for remdesivir alone.
Remdesivir is an antiviral drug, which was originally developed by Gilead Sciences to treat
Hepatitis C and was then tested against Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease, but was
ineffective for all of these viral infections.77; 78; 79 It is thought that remdesivir may be beneficial
for treating patients with COVID-19, and the FDA recently granted emergency use of remdesivir
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during the pandemic.80 In January 2020, the Wuhan Institute of Virology applied for a patent
covering the use of remdesivir as a treatment for COVID-19. However, such a move to claim
patent rights over unproven use of the treatment, made in the midst of a rapidly worsening public
health crisis, was heavily criticized.81 The need for claiming such patent rights was also questioned,
since the national law implementing the TRIPS Agreement explicitly permits compulsory
licensing.
Given the fact that the candidate therapeutics of many (if not most) of the ongoing clinical
trials are repurposed drugs, this paper calls on all countries to refrain from granting COVID-19related second medical use patents based on repurposed medicines and combination therapies.
4.3.

Reducing or suspending regulatory exclusivities
Even if the patent on the original version of a drug has expired, it still may not be possible

to bring a generic drug to the market if regulatory exclusivities apply. As discussed in the previous
section, both data exclusivity and market exclusivity provide additional monopoly power
alongside patent rights and can thus represent a significant barrier to equitable and affordable
access to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. Hence, regulatory exclusivities can hinder global
efforts to address the urgent need for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments in a timely and accessible
way.
Thus, regulatory exclusivities represent another area requiring quick action to facilitate the
introduction of generic competition and to bring down drug prices. It is also high time for
pharmaceutical companies, research institutes, and universities to share data and transfer
technologies to treat COVID-19. Applications of generic drugs for marketing approval should be
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encouraged even if they are based on the reference data submitted by originator drug producers.
The present COVID-19 public health emergency should justify reducing or suspending data and/or
market exclusivity, at least for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is also consistent
with the Open COVID Pledge, discussed further below, which states, “The Pledger will not assert
any regulatory exclusivity against any entity for the use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the
license granted in Section 1, and we will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent any
entity from doing so.”82
4.4.

Reducing or suspending patent linkage
Patent linkage is perhaps one of the most debated aspects of patent policy around the world.

Thus, it is a highly effective strategy for patent owners to shield their products from competition,
delay entry of generic drugs, and extend market monopolies beyond the protection granted by the
patents of the original product.83
Considering the detrimental effects of patent linkage on access to medicines by delaying
marketing approval of generics drugs and biosimilars and enabling the maintenance of high prices
of originator products, there has been significant concern about its effects in LMICs.84 In particular,
patent linkage also impedes the use of compulsory licensing, despite being recognized as a
flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement.85 Thus, patent linkage mechanisms should be avoided
where possible.
Since many bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements (e.g., FTAs) have “TRIPS-Plus” IP
provisions requiring trading partners to establish patent linkage mechanisms, it is recommended
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that countries, especially LMICs, should ensure that exemptions of essential medicines to patent
linkage are enabled for in domestic legislation. 86 ; 87 At the minimum, any patent linkage
mechanism should be in harmony with other domestic medicines policies.88 In particular, there
should be an exception to patent linkage such that it does not hinder the use of compulsory
licensing.
4.5.

Suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs
As noted in the Introduction section, Moderna pledged to suspend enforcement of its

COVID-19-related patents until the pandemic ends. However, some commentators argue such a
pledge is not enough to ensure broad access for everyone in need. 89 First, pharmaceutical
companies are free to determine when the pandemic ends.90 Second, it is also argued that the nonenforcement of IPRs is not sufficient without a commitment to share data, technical know-how,
and biological resources needed for other manufacturers to produce the vaccine and to scale up to
meet global needs. 91 Finally, it is also reasonable to demand suspension of IP enforcement,
especially considering many pharmaceutical companies had received a massive amount of public
funds from the government without any strings attached. For example, Moderna has received more
than $2.48 billion from the US government by far.92
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Nevertheless, the pledge made by Moderna is an important step to eliminate IP barriers to
vaccine development during the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, this paper calls on more
pharmaceutical companies to make pledges to suspend or waive enforcement of IPRs on COVID19-related technologies, including drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics, at least for the duration of this
pandemic.
4.6.

Issuing compulsory licenses in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic
The TRIPS Agreement has various built-in flexibilities that allow governments to take

measures to allow use by third parties of otherwise protected rights.93 The main flexibilities related
to battling the COVID-19 pandemic include the compulsory patent licensing under Article 31 and
31bis of the TRIPS Agreement and some exceptions (e.g., research exception, regulatory exception
or “Bolar” provision, patent eligibility exceptions, e.g., excluding diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for treating humans or animals) for patents under Articles 27 and 30.94; 95
Compulsory patent licensing allows governments to authorize the making, use, sale or
importation of patented products and technologies by third parties without the consent of the patent
owners. In some cases, the third party can be the government itself, which is referred to as
“government use.” Compulsory licensing is an important attempt by the TRIPS Agreement to
strike a balance between promoting access to existing drugs while promoting research and
development of new drugs.96
Compulsory licensing and government use of patents can only be employed under
conditions aimed at protecting the legitimate interests of the patent owners. Generally, a
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compulsory license cannot be issued unless attempts to obtain a voluntary license from the patent
owner on reasonable commercial terms have been unsuccessful. 97; 98 However, voluntary licensing
has several issues, such as lack of transparency and limitations in geographic coverage, which can
impact access to medicines, although the step of obtaining a voluntary license can be waived for
“national emergencies” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 99; 100 The Doha Declaration
states that Member States maintain “the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” and that a public health crisis can be an emergency
under this provision.101 The COVID-19 pandemic a public health crisis that has devastated many
Member States across the globe, which should trigger the special accommodation of the
flexibilities under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, including compulsory licensing without the
need for seeking a voluntary license on reasonable terms.102
It has been shown that compulsory licenses, where they have been granted, have led to a
significant reduction of drug prices.103 For example, in 2012, the generic drug manufacturer Natco
in India was granted a compulsory license for sorafenib, an anti-cancer drug and required to pay
6% royalties to Bayer AG, sorafenib’s patent right holder and a German company. With this
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compulsory license, the price of the generic version of sorafenib was reduced by 97% as compared
to Bayer’s price.104
Further, the threat of compulsory licensing can often lead to a positive outcome, such as
voluntary licensing. A study by Beall and Kuhn identified 24 grants of compulsory licensing in 17
countries for 22 drugs, only half of which actually resulted in compulsory licenses. 105 This is
because when countries signaled their intention to grant compulsory licenses, patent rights holders
generally conceded with price reductions through, for example, voluntary licensing or discounts.106
Several countries have announced consideration of compulsory licensing as part of their
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 107 For example, on March 19, 2020, Israel issued
compulsory patent licenses allowing generic versions of AbbVie Inc.’s HIV drug
lopinavir/ritonavir (brand name Kaletra) to be imported to treat COVID-19 patients.108 Under the
pressure of invoking compulsory licensing provisions citing “national emergency” by the Member
States of the WTO, Gilead recently signed non-exclusive voluntary licensing agreements with five
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to manufacture remdesivir for distribution in 127
countries.109
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However, compulsory licensing also has its limitations. First, the use of the patent is limited
to the purpose for which it is issued.110 A government must make an attempt to obtain consent
(e.g., voluntary licensing) of the patent owner unless there is a national emergency or other extreme
urgencies, such as COVID-19. Also, if the compulsory license is issued based on a national
emergency, it will be terminated when the national emergency is under control. In addition, the
patent owner has the right to receive payment for use under the compulsory license depending on
the circumstances of each case. However, determining the fair and reasonable payment (e.g., patent
royalty) that the patent owner should receive will likely be a subject of dispute and delay. Further,
if companies know that all their COVID-19 medications will be subject to compulsory licensing,
they might have less of an incentive to develop the drugs or to enter into particular markets.111
Nevertheless, compulsory licensing is a powerful public health tool, which can be
instrumental in mitigating insufficient supplies of essential COVID-19 vaccines and treatments
and reducing prohibitively expensive drug prices. 112 While currently there is no approved
treatment for COVID-19, governments are legally entitled under the TRIPS Agreement to issue
compulsory licenses for treatments authorized for emergency use. In particular, governments of
LMICs should prepare to issue compulsory licenses of any effective COVID-19 treatments in
anticipation of the needs of their most vulnerable populations.113
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4.7.

Participating in medicine patent pool and Open COVID Pledge
The patent pooling mechanism can be an effective tool to spur drug discovery and

development for control and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic. It acts as an intermediary or a
clearinghouse to pool inbound licenses on a broad array of medical IPRs and research data from
IPRs owners across the globe.114 The pooled licenses can be sublicensed on a royalty-free basis or
on equitable terms to qualified developers or manufacturers. 115 Through the patent pooling
mechanism, various IPRs owned by different owners are combined, which serves as a one-stopshop for all parties.116 Hence, transaction costs and risks will be substantially reduced. In addition,
the patent pooling mechanism will facilitate the access to research data and collaborative
innovation of relevant health technologies, thus accelerating response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The pooling mechanism can potentially increase equitable and affordable access to health
technologies in these desperate times. Recently, a proposal for a global intellectual property
pooling mechanism was proposed by Costa Rica, which received prompt support from the
WHO.117; 118
One of the important advantages of patent pooling is that it negotiates licenses from a
public health perspective. 119 In addition, the licenses under the patent pooling mechanism are
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transparent and predictable. All agreements are made available to the public on the organization’s
website. This is an improvement over voluntary licenses, the terms of which are generally kept
secret.
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to negatively impact the world, a number of
initiatives, such as “Open COVID Pledge,” have been launched to address the challenges
associated with the sharing of IP and knowledge in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.120
The Open COVID Pledge was developed by a group of scientists, lawyers, and entrepreneurs to
encourage businesses and research facilities to make their intellectual property available for use in
the fight against COVID-19.121 The Open COVID Pledge is aimed to encourage sharing of IP and
technologies to combat and end the pandemic without the need for timely and costly licenses or
royalty agreements.122
The main concern for patent pooling and the Open COVID Pledge is the degree of
participation by IPRs owners. IPRs owners devote a substantial sum of capital to develop their IP,
with the expectation of recouping their investments through IPRs. Thus, it remains unclear how
IPRs owners balance data sharing and open access to technologies against financial stability and
potential legal issues that may arise from participating in patent pooling or the Open COVID
Pledge due to IPRs owners’ legal obligations to their sponsors and other IP stakeholders.
4.8.

Invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement
To facilitate production and distribution of medical products to combat the COVID-19

pandemic, governments across the globe are taking steps to bypass or override patents and other
IPRs. The recent paper by Abbott et al. explores the possibility to invoke Article 73 (“Security
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Exceptions”) of the TRIPS Agreement as the legal basis to override IPRs by classifying the
COVID-19 as an “emergency in international relations.” 123 Abbott et al. concluded that the
COVID-19 pandemic can be considered an emergency in international relations under Article
73(b)(iii), which permits governments to take necessary measures to protect essential security
interests.124
In supporting invocation of Article 73 security expectations, it is first determined the
COVID-19 constitutes an emergency in international relations. Article 73 provides “Nothing in
this [TRIPS] Agreement shall be construed … to prevent a member from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war
or other emergency in international relations ….” 125 One of the major issues in combating and
ending the pandemic involves allocating medical products such as vaccines, medicines, personal
protection equipment (PPE) among nations as COVID-19 is transmitted across national borders
and affects people in many geographic regions. Under the present pandemic, the needs of LMICs
for medical devices and medicines will not be met in a timely way. Thus, the allocation of scarce
resources can be an issue of “international relations,” and a viable mechanism should be
established to ensure equitable and affordable access to these resources. 126 In addition to the
allocation issue of scarce resources, other pandemic-related issues can lead to an emergency in
international relations, including a significant slowdown of international trade and a deeply
contracted economy.127
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Abbott et al. concluded that overriding IPRs is among the actions considered necessary
“for the protection of its essential security interests” under Article 73(b).128 Use of Article 73 by a
WTO member to override IPRs or market exclusivity interests in medical devices or medicines
will allow its domestic manufacturers or importers to use protected technologies of foreign IPR
owners that are critical for fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Such use of Article 73 to override
IPRs is reasonably and directly related to addressing the national security interest.129
However, as with many other policy measures, overriding IPRs may face challenges based
on national laws. Article 73 only addresses the challenges from another member in the WTO but
not potential domestic law problems.130
IV. Conclusion
While IP laws and policy are crucial in incentivizing research and development of vital
health technologies, they are far from perfect and may very well require further adjustment or
reform to meet overarching public interests, especially when it comes to facing unprecedented
global health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The monopolies established by IP
protection and regulatory exclusivities have led to barriers to equitable and affordable access to
essential drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics for combating the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple policy
instruments can be employed in concert to reduce or eliminate these barriers to ensure broad access
to COVID-19 vaccines or treatments for people in need.
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